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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COM-
MISSION-RESPONSIBLE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LISTENING
PUBLIC GRANTED STANDING TO INTERVENE AT FCC HEARINGS.
Office of Communiiations of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Lamar Life Broadcasting Company, owners of television station
WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, filed an application for renewal of
the station's broadcasting license with the Federal Communication
Commission. Appellants1 sought to have WLBT's renewal applica-
tion denied by filing a petition and accompanying affidavits2 raising
substantial issues of fact as to whether a renewal would be within
the public interest. The FCC's order dismissed appellant's petition
for lack of standing as a "party in interest" to intervene at the hear-
ing, and granted to Lamar Life Broadcasting a one year probationary
license with strict requirements.3
1 Appellants are (1) Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ, an
instrumentality of the United Church of Christ, a national denomination with substan-
tial membership within WLBT's prime service area; (2) Aron Henry and Robert L. T.
Smith, residents of the state of Mississippi, television owners, and persons active in the
leadership of civic and civil rights groups; and (3) United Church of Christ at Touga-
loo, a congregation of the United Church of Christ.
2 Communications Act Amendments, 1960, § 309, 74 Stat. 890, 47 U.S.C. § 309
(1964).
(d) (1) Any party in interest may file with the Commission a petition to
deny any application . . .to which subsection (b) of this section applies at
any time prior to the day of Commission grant thereof without hearing or the
day of formal designation thereof for hearing .... The petition shall contain
specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in
interest and that a grant of the application would be prima facie inconsistent
with subsection (a) of this section. Such allegations of fact shall, except for
those of which official notice may be taken, be supported by affidavit of a per-
son or persons with personal knowledge thereof.
3 In re Application of Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965). The
allegations presented to the Commission and referred to by the circuit court showed a
long history of programming misconduct dating back to 1955, when WLBT deliberately
cut off a national television program in which a representative of the NAACP was
speaking. In 1957, a program featuring Caucasian panelists discussing "the Little Rock
crisis" was presented. The discussion advocated a segregationist policy, and Negroes
were not allowed to participate. In 1958, WLBT's license was renewed only after a
short delay, during which the Commissioner sought to determine the station's broad-
casting policy. The station claimed that its policy was to avoid presenting programs
that dealt with racial integration. Thereafter on several occasions, WLBT programming
exhibited wholly segregationist views.
The station also had several weekly religious programs, but Negro churches were
allowed to participate in only one. This program was exclusively Negro and was broad-
cast at 6:45 A.M. on Sunday for fifteen minutes. Negro colleges were allowed to par-
ticipate to a limited extent in a program called "Our Colleges," but never for any dis-
cussion of matters of academic interest. In other aspects the Negro community was sub-
stantially ignored and abused by the station.
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On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
held, reversed: Appellants, or some of them, must be granted stand-
ing to intervene at the agency level; the previously followed de-
terminants for standing to intervene are not exclusive. Furtherance
of the public interest, convenience, and necessity may, in some in-
stances, best be accomplished by allowing representatives of the
listening audience standing to intervene as "parties in interest" at
hearings -where the renewal of a broadcasting license is contested.
Furthermore, programming misconduct of the type and degree al-
leged in the petition is inconsistent with the public interest. The
case was therefore remanded to the Commission for a hearing on the
facts, with appellants, or some of them, participating. Office of Com-
munications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
The determinants for standing to appeal an FCC decision have
historically been twofold. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station4 has
been judicially interpreted as holding that one who will suffer "eco-
nomic injury" due to an FCC order may have standing to appeal that
order.5 Sanders points out that "economic injury" alone will not be a
ground for standing, without a corresponding showing that competL-
tion might also be injurious to the "public convenience, interest, or
necessity .... ." National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC,7 known as
the KOA case, was the foundation for the second major determinant.
KOA gave standing to appeal a Commission decision allowing to
another broadcaster operational privileges which created "electrical
interference" in the broadcast pattern of the appealing party. As a
result of Sanders and KOA, a party who sought standing to appeal
an FCC decision had to show either "economic injury" or "electrical
interference."
Historically, standing to intervene at an agency hearing and stand-
ing to appeal from an agency decision have not been based entirely
upon the same criteria." However, the FCC, which denotes an in-
Although the Commission apparently found misconduct, it granted a renewal in the
apparent hope that WLBT would reform its practices. The renewal required the station
to adhere to the established requirements of the Fairness Doctrine, infra note 28, and to
meet with the petitioners to work out the problems alleged in the petition.
4 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
n See Communication Act of 1934, § 402(b) (2), 48 Stat. 1093. (This section
granted the right to appeal an FCC decision to one "aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected.").
6 309 U.S. at 473.
7 132 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1942), afl'd, 319 U.S. 239 (1943).
8 1 DAvis, ADnmiNisTrsvE LAw TREATISE § 8.11, 564 (1958).
The problem of right to intervene in administrative proceedings is closely
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tervening party a "party in interest" and an appealing party an
"aggrieved party," has held the same two criteria to be determinative
of standing for both proceduresY The new determinant set forth in
Office of Communications allows standing to intervene at the hearing
level to ". . . a limited number of responsible representatives of the
listening public when such representatives seek participation."'10
To recognize the right of the general public to intervene in FCC
proceedings is not a completely new concept. However, the idea
apparently has not been exploited to date, although in several in-
stances certain members of the public have been allowed standing to
appeal the orders or decisions of various other administrative
bodies.:" It seems logical to proceed one step further and grant
standing to intervene at the hearing level to representatives of the
television viewing public.'
2
Apparently at no time has a determination of "parties in interest"
been limited solely to a finding that one suffered "economic injury"
or "electrical interference." As noted in Office of Communications,
13
Sanders did not make "economic injury" a sole criterion for deter-
mining who is a "party in interest."'14 Nor did KOA attempt to make
related to and in some measure governed by the elaborate body of law con-
cerning standing to challenge and to enforce administrative action. But inter-
vention and standing to challenge are not the same and are not governed by
the same considerations. . . . Furthermore, the consequences of intervention
are different from the consequences of allowing a party to obtain review.
Intervention depends not only upon the directness and importance of the
effects of the proceedings upon the interest of the party seeking to intervene,
but it also depends upon the effect upon the proceedings of allowing inter-
vention.
0 Metropolitan Television Co. v. United States, 221 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1955)
("A 'party in interest' is one who is 'aggrieved or whose interests are adversely af-
fected'. § 402(b)."); cf. Seaboard & Western Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950) ("It is not disputed that one who may
appeal may intervene."). For a full development of the history of standing at FCC
procedures, see Comment, Standing to Sue Before the FCC, 55 COLUm. L. REv. 209,
(1955).
10 Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994,
1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11 Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (granted railroad passenger
right to appeal order of ICC) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) (granted standing to ap-
peal an order of the Federal Power Commission to a conservation group) ; Bebchick v.
Public Util. Comm'n of D.C., 287 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (granted standing to
consumer to appeal order of the Commission); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1953) (granted standing to appeal order of Federal Securities Administrator).
12 See Metropolitan Television Company v. United States, 221 F.2d 879, 880 (D.C.
Cir. 1955); Seaboard & Western Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515 (1950), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 963 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
13 359 F.2d at 1001.
14 309 U.S. at 477.
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the determinants "economic injury" and "electrical interference" ex-
clusive.15
Congress has evidently had mixed feelings as to the desirability
of allowing further determinants in classifying one as a "party in
interest." In 1951, under an apparent apprehension that a "host of
parties" would descend upon the FCC, the Senate defined "party in
interest" by the determinants set forth in Sanders and KOA.' 6 How-
ever, no mention was made with respect to the exclusion of other
determinants, and the Senate, in a later report, broadened its views
concerning "party in interest." 17 Thus, it is apparent that the Office
of Communieations court was not taking an unprecedented step by
allowing responsible members of the listening public standing to
intervene in an FCC hearing. In fact, the determinant established by
Office of Communications should help to alleviate the problem of
protests "based on grounds which have little or no relationship to
the public interest."' 8
The new determinant for standing to intervene, as set forth in
the instant case, will apply only to applications for renewal of
licenses. In the granting of a new license, it is difficult to imagine,
and should not be recognized, that the listening public would have
any grounds for complaint. For those who fear 0 that the new deter-
minant may lead some parties to attempt intervention merely to delay
the renewal of licenses, or to injure the licensee, it is noteworthy that
Congress has provided an extension of the license during the renewal
proceedings.20
Even though the new determinant will not encourage dilatory
practices, it is possible that by the very nature of the new determinant
15 132 F.2d at 547 ("It does not follow that others, who may be affected adversely
though not financially, will be neither willing nor able to appeal.").
16 S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).
17 S. REP. No. 1231, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955) ("The committee also wishes
to call attention to the fact that the term 'party in interest' encompasses a wide variety
of persons, all of whom have standing to protest .... ").
18 H. R. REP. No. 1051, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955).
10 This fear has been expressed by Congress in one of its reports; it was there
pointed out that the main difficulty in determining a "party in interest" was the fact
that persons with no legitimate interest to intervene attempted to do so merely to delay
the licensing procedure. S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).
20 Administrative Procedure Act § 9, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1008(b)
(1965).
In any case in which the licensee has, in accordance with agency rules, made
timely and sufficient application for a renewal or a new license, no license
with reference to any activity of a continuing nature shall expire until such
application shall have been finally determined by the agency.
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some "clogging" of the hearing process may take place. This possi-
bility exists because participation in an FCC hearing is somewhat
unique. While other administrative agencies have the power to limit
participation by parties,21 the FCC must allow full participation by
any "party in interest."22 Hence the FCC, by its rule making power,23
must carefully define who are "responsible representatives of the
listening public" as a means of insuring that the public interest will
be served. The Office of Communications court, although recognizing
the need for defining "responsible representatives," did not set out
any useful guide lines for this definition.
In promulgating the rules under which "responsible representatives
of the listening public" will be defined, the following proffered guide
lines may prove helpful. "Listening public" should initially be de-
fined as any group showing a substantial number of members within
the total listening audience. Following such a showing, the group
should be allowed representation upon its allegations of the appli-
cant's broadcasting misconduct which has injured the group.'
21 1 DAvis, op. cit. supra note, at 545 ("Although rules of practice of regulatory
agencies characteristically leave specific problems for agency discretion, the rules usually
recognize that intervention need not be completely granted or completely denied but
that limited participation may be permitted.").
22 Communications Act Amendments, 1960, § 309, 74 Stat. 891, 47 U.S.C. § 309
(1964).
If in the case of any application to which subsection (a) of this section
applies, a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the Com-
mission for any reason is unable to make the finding specified in such sub-
section, it shall formally designate the application for hearing on the ground
or reasons then obtaining . . . . Any hearing subsequently held upon such
application shall be a full hearing in which the applicant and all other
parties in interest shall be permitted to participate ...
The meaning of full hearing ". . . under § 309 means that every party shall have the
right to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal
evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts." United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202
(1956). This hearing might well be equated to a full trial, and since the FCC does
not have the facilities to function as a court, its docket must be effectively limited.
The Commission must have a hearing when there are allegations of misconduct of
the degree made in Office of Communications. See material cited note 3 supra. The
circuit court in the instant case held that if the allegation were proven, then, as a mat-
ter of law, there could be no finding that the public interest would be served, and the
license should not be renewed. 359 F.2d at 1007.
23 Communications Act of 1934, § 4, 48 Stat. 1068, 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1964).
(i) The Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as may
be necessary in the execution of its functions.
24 Communications Act Amendments, 1960, § 309, 74 Stat. 889 (1960), 47 U.S.C.
§ 309 (1964).
(a) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Commission shall deter-
mine.., whether the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
by the granting of such application . ...
In order that a "party in interest" be granted a hearing, that party must, in its peti-
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The next step involves a definition of an injured group. A general
guide line for defining injured group may be found in the policy set
out by the FCC concerning the responsibility of the broadcaster to
the needs of the listening public.2" The policy requires that the
"tastes, needs and desires of the public he is licensed to serve . .
must not be neglected by the broadcaster.20 Upon an allegation of
policy neglect, injured group status should be granted.
For more specific guide lines, the Commission should consider the
criteria used by the court in the instant case.27 A group prejudiced
by a violation of the Fairness Doctrine, as defined by the FCC,28
might well be designated an injured group. Because the duty im-
posed on the broadcaster under the Fairness Doctrine is unmistakable
with respect to his relations with the public, violations thereof
should allow the injured group standing to intervene. A group al-
leging discrimination should also be termed an injured group. Thus
in the present case, where a broadcaster discriminated against a
group consisting of 45% of the listening public, standing to inter-
vene should be allowed.
tion to deny the application, allege, and support by affidavit, facts sufficient to show
that a granting of the license would be inconsistent with the public interest, convenience,
and necessity. See Communications Act Amendments, 1960, § 309, 74 Stat. 890, 74
U.S.C. § 309 (1964), note 2 supra.
25 Network Programming Inquiry-Report and Statement of Policy (FCC 60-970) 25
Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
In the fulfillment of his obligation the broadcaster should consider the tastes,
needs and desires of the public he is licensed to serve in developing his pro-
gramming and should exercise conscientious efforts not only to ascertain them
but also to carry them out as well as he reasonably can.
26 Ibid.
27 359 F.2d at 998-99.
28 In re Editorializing By Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257-58 (1949).
[Tihe Commission believes that under the American system of broadcasting
the individual licensees of radio stations have the responsibility for determin-
ing the specific program material to be broadcast over their stations. This
choice, however, must be exercised in a manner consistent with the basic
policy of the Congress that radio be maintained as a medium of free speech
for the general public as a whole rather than as an outlet for the purely per-
sonal or private interests of the licensee. This requires that licensees devote a
reasonable percentage of their broadcasting time to the discussion of public
issues of interest in the community served by their stations and that such pro-
grams be designed so that the public has a reasonable opportunity to hear dif-
ferent opposing positions on the public issues of interest and importance in
the community .... Such presentation may include the identified expression of
the licensee's personal viewpoint as part of the more general presentation of
views or comments on the various issues, but the opportunity of licensees to
present such views as they may have on matters of controversy may not be
utilized to achieve a partisan or one-sided presentation of issues. Licensee
editorialiation is but one aspect of freedom of expression by means of radio.
Only insofar as it is exercised in conformity with the paramount right of the
public to hear a reasonably balanced presentation of all responsible viewpoints
on particular issues can such editorialization be considered to be consistent
with the licensee's duty to operate in the public interest. For the licensee is a
trustee impressed with the duty of preserving for the public generally radio
as a medium of free expression and fair presentation.
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Obviously, the entire injured group will not be designated a "party
in interest;" upon meeting certain requirements, one representative
should be recognized from each injured group.29 The accepted re-
quirement for "party in interest," as set forth in Sanders and KOA,
and formalized with the definition of the term "Private Attorney
General," 30 is that the person be allowed standing only to vindicate
the public interest.
In determining who will vindicate the public interest, it should
be required that the "responsible representative" show that he has
some special interest in the injured group's welfare which separates
him from other members of the injured group. Where the injured
group is organized, an officer thereof might meet this requirement.
Where the group is unorganized, the person attempting to represent
it should be required to show that he is familiar with the problems
of the group, and that he is considered a distinguished member by
the group.
The Office of Communications court has taken a broad step to
insure adherence to the Congressional mandate that the public in-
terest be adequately represented in FCC hearings. However, the
court has left with the FCC the problem of determining who are
"parties in interest" under the new determinant. The guide lines
herein discussed are not exclusive, for it is possible that representa-
tion of the public interest may come from a different quarter than
has been suggested. The decision should serve as a warning to broad-
casters that they must exercise their license privileges in such manner
as will be beneficial to the listening public generally, and non-dis-
criminatory to any segment thereof.
WILLIAM D. PALMER
29 Since it is contemplated that every participating party will do so "fully," as de-
fined in note 22 supra, to allow more than one representative per group would lead
to wasteful duplication of effort and material presented. Another consideration in allow-
ing only one representative per group is that there may be more than one injured group
participating. To allow more than one representative from each group would contribute
little, and might tend to "dog" the proceedings.
30 Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943). The court, in discussing whether a consumer may be involved in
administrative actions, formalized the theory of private Attorney General.
Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-official
person... authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation
of his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual contro-
versy, and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Congress from em-
powering any person, official or not, to institute a proceeding involving such
a controversy, even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.
Such persons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals.
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